Ukraine steel chief says EU tariffs targeting China are also hurting Ukraine

The head of one of Ukraine’s largest steel companies has urged the European Union to ease import restrictions on Ukrainian steel, arguing that measures designed to curb cheap imports from China and Turkey have also squeezed a wartime ally. Yuriy Ryzhenkov, chief executive of Metinvest, told the BBC the EU’s recently imposed steel limits were “unfair” and put in place “without any consideration for the situation Ukraine is in.” He said Ukraine needs at least a carve-out to keep access to the European market.

A European Commission spokesperson said the EU “took into account the difficult situation” of Ukraine when setting steel policy. The bloc has capped tariff-free steel imports at 18.3 million tonnes a year — a 47% reduction from 2024 levels — to protect manufacturers in member states from low-cost foreign steel. Country-specific quotas exist, including for Ukraine, but Brussels acknowledged that Ukraine’s guaranteed volume is lower than in past years. Despite a free-trade agreement with Ukraine, the EU can still apply separate trade-protection measures.

Ukraine’s steel industry estimates that exports to the EU could ultimately fall by about 50–60%. That matters because steel is a foundation of Ukraine’s economy: before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, metallurgy and mining accounted for roughly 10% of national income and about a third of exports, with the EU as the top customer. Ryzhenkov said access to Europe is “crucial for survival,” warning that Ukraine has few realistic alternative markets.

For the EU: The quotas and tariffs are meant to give European mills breathing room. In theory, lower import volumes can lift domestic prices, improve plant utilisation, and slow the closure of capacity that has struggled against cheaper Chinese and Turkish steel. In practice, the Ukraine case shows a trade-off: a policy aimed at “non-market” or low-price exporters can also restrict a neighbouring supplier that is politically aligned with the EU. If Ukrainian volumes fall sharply, some EU buyers of slabs, coils, or semi-finished steel may need to source elsewhere — which could mean higher costs, longer lead times, or more exposure to other overseas mills. EU producers may benefit in the short term, but they also remain tied to energy prices, carbon costs, and demand from construction and manufacturing.

For the US: This episode is not a US tariff decision, so any effect on American steel is indirect. Historically, the United States has also used import barriers to defend its mills. When one large market (the EU) tightens access, steel that cannot enter Europe can be redirected toward other destinations, including North America. That “trade diversion” can put extra pressure on US prices and utilisation if surplus metal finds a home there. At the same time, US mills often argue that global overcapacity — especially from China — is the core problem, so they may view EU tightening as evidence that other regions are catching up to a more protectionist stance. The net result for US producers depends on whether diverted imports actually arrive, how strong US construction and auto demand is, and whether Washington keeps its own steel safeguards in place. Those flows should be checked against current US trade data rather than assumed.

Steel is a cyclical, capital-heavy industry. The main risks, beyond this one dispute, typically include:

• Global overcapacity: When more steel is produced than the world needs, prices fall and even efficient plants struggle.
• Trade barriers and diversion: Tariffs, quotas, and anti-dumping duties can protect one market while pushing surplus steel into another.
• Energy and carbon costs: Steelmaking is energy-intensive. Spikes in gas and electricity prices, plus carbon pricing, can wipe out margins.
• Demand shocks: Construction, infrastructure, autos, and machinery drive steel use. A housing slowdown or weaker industrial output hits mills quickly.
• Geopolitics and logistics: War, sanctions, blocked ports, and insurance costs can cut off plants and customers overnight, as Ukraine’s mills have shown.
• Raw-material volatility: Iron ore, coking coal, and scrap prices swing sharply and are hard to pass through in a weak market.
• Green-transition pressure: Buyers and regulators increasingly want lower-emission steel. Mills that cannot fund cleaner technology risk losing customers and capital.
• Policy uncertainty: Sudden quota cuts, tariff hikes, or “compensation” deals that do not fully replace lost volumes make long-term investment harder.

Ukraine’s experience concentrates several of these at once: bombardment of mills, lost logistics, a forced reliance on one main export market, and then tighter access to that market.

There is no single “best” solution that guarantees profit. Steel firms face different costs, customers, and national rules. In general, companies that weather this kind of shock tend to combine several approaches:

1. Move up the value chain — from basic commodity grades toward specialised, higher-margin products that are harder to replace with dumped imports.
2. Diversify customers and routes — so survival does not depend on one bloc’s quota, while remaining realistic about freight, insurance, and politics.
3. Cut cost and energy intensity — efficiency, scrap use, and cleaner processes lower break-even points and help meet buyer climate targets.
4. Secure official market access — tariff-rate quotas, origin rules, and any available carve-outs or compensation need active legal and government engagement.
5. Protect people and plants — in conflict zones, continuity depends first on safety procedures, shelters, and insurance; Metinvest has expanded covered areas, but a whole mill cannot be fully shielded.
6. Stay financially conservative — cash buffers, flexible output, and cautious expansion matter more than chasing volume in a protected, oversupplied market.

For Ukrainian producers specifically, Ryzhenkov’s core ask is political: a carve-out so wartime steel is not treated like other import competition. That is a government-to-government issue, not something individual mills can solve alone. None of this is investment advice; companies should weigh local law, contracts, and professional counsel.

The EU measures send several signals at once, some in tension with each other.

First, they tell domestic steelmakers: we will still use hard trade tools to defend jobs and capacity against cheap imports, even after a free-trade deal with a partner country. Second, they tell exporters in China, Turkey, and elsewhere: Europe is less open to unlimited steel, and surplus production will meet a lower ceiling. Third, they risk telling Ukraine — and other vulnerable suppliers — that strategic solidarity has limits when it collides with industrial policy. Ryzhenkov’s complaint is exactly that: Ukraine was “bundled together” with other importers despite the war.

To the rest of the world, the broader message is that steel is again a strategic, protected sector. Countries are more willing to cap volumes, accept higher prices at home, and live with diplomatic friction. That can encourage other governments to copy similar quotas, which may fragment trade further. It can also encourage mills to lobby harder and invest less in open-market competitiveness.

The EU’s counter-message is narrower: Ukraine still has a quota, remains “an important exporter,” and has been offered compensations. Whether that is enough is the heart of the dispute. If exports to Europe fall by half or more while mills are under fire and winter logistics worsen, the political message Kyiv hears will be harsher than the one Brussels intends.

EU steel limits may support European mills against cheap Chinese and Turkish metal, and they may indirectly reshape flows that US producers watch closely. They also expose a structural risk for the whole industry: overcapacity plus geopolitics plus protectionism. For companies, resilience comes from higher-value products, diversified markets, lower costs, and secured market access — not from any promised windfall. The tariff regime tells the world that Europe will defend its steel base; Ukraine’s warning is that allies can still get caught in the net.

At Bellmont&Co we see this in practical terms. Europe is defending its mills. Ukraine does not want to be treated as the cheap-import problem those quotas were written to stop. Both points can be true. Steel is no longer just a commodity market. It is political, logistical, and a matter of who can actually be qualified.

A lower EU ceiling does not remove steel. It reallocates it. Some stays in Europe at a higher cost or longer lead time. Some looks for other doors, including the United States. For buyers in shipbuilding and defence, origin and documentation now sit next to price.

Fairness is a government argument – Firms still need to identify who can supply, predict where the gaps will open, and work with counterparties they can qualify on both sides of the Atlantic.